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Rubin: Prison Law

PRISON LAW

BEFORE AND AFTER WILSON V. SEITER:
CASES CHALLENGING THE
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
I.

INTRODUC'FION

The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that prisoners
do not leave their civil rights at the prison or jail door.l The cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment 2
has consistently provided an avenue for prisoners to protest
inadequate medical care, lack of safety measures, and inhumane
conditions of confinement within the prisons. To determine if
a challenged condition of confinement violated the eighth
amendment prior to Wilson v. Seiter, 3 the courts applied an
objective standard. The objective standard required the courts
to consider whether a reasonable person would find that the condition was so serious a deprivation of basic human needs that
it offended the evolving standards of decency.' Recently the
Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Seiter,6 added a subjective element
to the standard. In addition to finding the challenged condition
is objectively severe, an inquiry into the prison officials' state
of mind must also be performed to determine if they were
deliberately indifferent to the condition that resulted in the
harm to the prisoner.s The deliberate indifference standard was
used previously only in those cases where an individual prisoner
1. See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). See infra note 45 for a discussion of
the case.
2. U.S. CON ST. art. VIII. See infra note 8 for the text of the eighth amendment.
3. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). See infra note 63 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the case.
4. The standard is most comprehensively laid out in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337 (1981). To determine whether the condition was objectively severe the courts were
required to analyze scientific and historical evidence concerning the challenged
deprivation, as well as laws enacted outside of the prison context. [d. at 346-347. See
infra note 58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
5. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
6. [d. at 2322-2328.
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was challenging the inadequate attention to his or her particular medical needs or personal safety. 7
This article will examine the development of the standard
for eighth amendment review used in cases challenging the conditions of confinement before and after Wilson. It will begin
with a examination of the interpretations of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause in the Supreme Court. This article will then analyze the objective standard for eighth amendment review as applied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in prison condition cases. After an analysis of the subjective
standard for eighth amendment review established in Wilson
u. Seiter, the article will survey how the Ninth Circuit and other
circuits have applied this new standard.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD FOR EIGHTH
AMENDMENT REVIEW

A.

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE MEANING OF CRUEL AND

UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution
protects an individual from the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. 8 Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the
Supreme Court has struggled to determine the precise meaning of this amendment as intended by the framers of the constitution. 9 The Court's interpretations have generally fallen
within two categories: (1) a traditional interpretation based on
7. See, e.g., Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) (See infra note 75
and accompanying text for a discussion of the case) and Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d
457 (9th Cir. 1986) (See infra note 67 for a discussion of the case).
8. U.S. CONST., art. VII., The Eighth Amendment reads as follows:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.
The eighth amendment has been applied to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. art. XIV. See Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962).
9. See generally Note, The Eighth Amendment, Becarria, and the Enlightenment:
An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment
Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 783 (1969) (Hereinafter Beccaria). This article discusses the
historical foundation of the eighth amendment and how the Supreme Court has interpreted this amendment, specifically in the Court's decision in Weems v. United States
and its focus on the excessiveness rather than the barbarity of punishment. Id. See
also Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning,
57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969). See infra note 13 for a discussion of the article.
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the Court's understanding of the English Bill of Rights and its
prohibition on tortuous and barbarous punishment,10 and (2)
a more expansive interpretation based on these English law
prohibitions as well as concepts of excessiveness. ll
1.

The Traditional Interpretation

The Supreme Court most frequently attributes the origin
of the cruel and unusual punishment clause to the English Bill
of Rights of 1688. 12 The Court has often contemplated that this
clause in the eighth amendment was intended to prohibit
methods of punishment similar to those barred by the English
Bill of Rights, 13 namely tortuous and barbaric methods of punishments. 14 The traditional standard for reviewing the constitutionality of a punishment has often focused, therefore, on
the methods of punishment and whether these methods
approach the level of cruelty or unusualness as those prohibited under English Law. 16
In In re Kemmler,18 the Supreme Court considered the
issue of whether death by electrocution violated the eighth
10. See Becarria, 24 BUFF. L. REV. at 786-792.
11. See Id. at 793-808.

12. Id. at 788.
It is the English Bill of Rights of 1689 which is said most
often to be the origin of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" and the wording of the subsequent American Bill
of rights, thus, has been seen as a mere verbatim copy with
naturally a coextensive meaning.
Id.

13. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning,
57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 845-846 (1969). Granucci discusses the Framers misinterpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the English Bill of Rights. He explains
that they mistakenly interpreted the English Bill of Rights as barring barbarous methods of punishment in reaction to the treason trials of the "Bloody Assize" and thereby
limiting the eighth amendments coverage to include only a ban on tortuous or barbarous
methods of punishment such as quartering, thumb screws, etc. Granucci explains that
the origin of the clause stems from the minority dissent of the House of Lords· in the Titus
Oates case. The minority focused on the excessiveness of the punishment imposed on
Oates as cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 856-859.
14. Becarria, 24 BUFF. L.REV. at 788. Those punishments considered to be inherently cruel include crucirtxion, quartering, disembowelment, burning at the stake,
breaking on the wheel and subjection to the rack. Id.
15. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). See infra note 16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
16. 136 U.S. 436 (1890). Kemmler was found guilty and sentenced to death by electrocution for the murder of his wife. The New York Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentencing. Kemmler petitioned the Supreme Court on the ground that
electricity was an unconstitutional mode of imposing death. The Supreme Court
held that death by electricity was a humane method of execution. Id. at 447.
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amendment. 17 The Court observed that only those punishments that are equally as cruel as those meant to be proscribed by the English Bill of Rights are prohibited by the
constitution. 18 The Court continued "that punishments are
cruel if they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word
as used in the constitution. "19 The Supreme Court concluded that
since electrocution is a quick and painless method of putting
someone to death, it does not violate the eighth amendment. 20
The Supreme Court used a similar interpretation in
Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber.21 The Court denied petitioner's contention that a second electrocution, after the initial
one had failed to kill him, would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 22 The Court found that this was not within
the parameters of cruel and unusual punishment since "the cruelty against which the constitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish
life humanely."23 Furthermore, since there was no intention on
the part of the state or the executioner to impose unnecessary
pain on petitioner,24 this previously determined humane mode
of punishment25 would not be rendered cruel and unusual. 26
2.

The Expansive Interpretation

The Supreme Court has also interpreted the cruel and
unusual punishment clause to prohibit more than just the
imposition of barbarous or tortuous methods punishment. In
17. Id. The court also considered whether death by electrocution violated the cruel
and unusual clause of the New York constitution, which,like most states, is identical
to the United States constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 440.
18. Id. at 446.
19. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446.
20. Id. at 443.
21. 329 U.S. 452 (1946).
22. Id. at 463-464.
23. Id. at 464.
24. Id. The court noted that the failure of the execution was an accident. Id.
25. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1910).
26. See Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463-464. The court indicated that "prohibition
against the wanton infliction of pain," is directly attributable to the English Bill of
Rights.Id. at 463. The Court appears to be indicating that absent a showing that the
method of execution is cruel or unusual or that the state or executioner intended to
subject the petitioner to the unnecessary pain of a repeat electrocution no constitutional violation can be found. Id. This observation is what the Supreme Court in Wilson
relied upon in part to require a state of mind inquiry in cases challenging the constitutionality of conditions of confinement. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2322-2323 (1991).
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Weems v. United States,27 the Supreme Court noted that the
framers had surely intended to prohibit more than just tortuous and barbarous punishments.28 The Court interpreted the
clause as "progressive, .... not fastened to the obsolete, but (able
to) acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
a humane justice."29 The Court, relying on the dissent from
O'Neil v. Vermont, 30 held that the imposition of a 15-year sentence of hard labor was excessive in proportion to the offense
committed, and was therefore in violation of the eighth amendment. 31 The Supreme Court in Weems expanded the interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause to prohibit
more than punishments which include physical pain.32 If a punishment is so severe or excessive that it is disproportionate to
the crime, the eighth amendment is violated. 33
In Trop v. Dulles 34 the issue before the court was whether
denationalization,36 the penalty for wartime desertion, was
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. 36
The Supreme Court agreed with Weems 37 that the meaning of
27. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The issue before the court was whether the imposition
ofa sentence of 15 years hard labor for the crime of falsifying government documents
was cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning ofthe Eighth amendment. The
Court held that the punishment was cruel and unusual due to its excessive and
unusual character.ld. at 377.
28. Id. at 372.
29. Id. at 377.
30. 144 U.S. 323 (1892). A man was convicted of307 violations of the Vermont
liquor laws and sentenced to 54 years of hard labor.ld at 330. The majority refused
to discuss the constitutionality of the contested punishment since the eighth amendment did not apply to the states.ld. Justices Field, Harlan and Brewer in their dissent, observed that the eighth amendment did apply to the states through the
fourteenth amendment and that the eighth amendment was meant to prohibit tortuous
methods of punishment as well as excessive or severe punishments that were grossly disproportionate to the offenses. Justice Field stated:
54 years confinement at hard labor, away from one's home
and relatives, and thereby prevented from giving assistance
to them or receiving comfort from them, is a punishment at
the severity of which, considering the offenses, it is hard to
believe that any man of right feeling and hearing can refrain
from shuddering... the punishment was greatly beyond anything required by any humane law for the offenses.
Id. at 339-340.
31. Weems, 217 U.S. at 379.
32. Id. at 372.
33.Id.
34. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
35. Denationalization is a penalty in which an individual's citizenship is taken
away and the individual is rendered stateless.
36. Trop, 356 U.S. 86.
37. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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the eighth amendment was not intended to be static. S8 The
Court observed that the eighth amendment "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."89 The Court held that although
the punishment involved no physical torture, destroying an
individual's status in society was cruel and unusual punishment in accord with society's standards of decency.40 Justice
Brennan, in his concurring opinion, used a concept of excessiveness similar to Weems. 41 Brennan observed that denationalization was an excessive punishment, when compared
with other forms of punishment available for desertion, because
it was an inefficient and unnecessary way to attain the legitimate penal aims of deterrence and rehabilitation.43
The Supreme Court has used the progressive interpretation
of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause set forth in Weems and Trop in many subsequent cases,
most significantly to find under what circumstances the death
penalty is, and is not, unconstitutional. 48 The Supreme Court
38. Trap, 356 U.S. at 101.
39. [d. The Court also noted that the cruel and unusual punishment clause was
taken from the English Bill of Rights, and the principle it represents was taken from
the Magna Carta; thus, the underlying concept of the eighth amendment is the dignity of man. [d. at 100.
40. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102. The Court further noted that denationalization,
... is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for
it destroys for the individual the political existence that
was centuries in the development. The punishment strips the
citizen of his status in the national and international political community.
[d. at 101-102.
41. [d. at 110 (Brennan J., concurring).
42. [d. at 111 (Brennan J., concurring) Brennan explained that denationalization is the antithesis of rehabilitation, for instead of helping the individual to become
a useful member of society, it makes him an outcast. Further, since the ramifications
of denationalization are not yet known, it would not be an effective deterrent measure.
Brennan noted that penal aims would be more successfully achieved by an alternate
method of punishment. [d. at 113-114. (Brennan, J., concurring)
43. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The issue was whether the imposition
of the death penalty for the rape cases before the court was cruel and unusual
punishment. The Supreme Court held that the death penalty in those cases constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Brennan, in the concurring opinion, 408
U.S. 238, 256-305 (J. Brennan, concurring), thought that the death penalty should be
eliminated in all situations. [d. at 256-305. He stated that "(t)he punishment of death
stands condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity.- [d. at 305. But cr., Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), holding that a Georgia law imposing the death
penalty for murder did not violate the eighth amendment and that the death
penalty was not unconstitutional. [d. at 187. The Court reached this decision using
the expanded interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Contrary
to Furman, the court found that the death penalty "comports with the basic concept
of human dignity" and serves the legitimate penal purposes of retribution and deterrence; therefore, it is a justified and necessary punishment. 1d. at 182.
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has also used the concept of excessiveness in subsequent
decisions to find that certain punishments and penal practices
are unconstitutional."

B.

THE APPLICATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO PRISON
CONDITION CASES

The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that a prisoner
does not leave his civil rights at the prison door.46 Certain
conditions of prison confinement have been held to be a part
of punishment and therefore subject to scrutiny under the
broad interpretation of the eighth amendment. 46 In Estelle
v. Gamble" the Supreme Court applied the eighth amendment to prisons, noting that the Constitution imposes a duty
upon the state to protect the prisoners' safety and well being. 48
This duty exists because the state has taken away the prisoners' liberty, and the prisoners are thus unable to care for
themselves. 49 Estelle did not specifically deal with prison conditions but rather whether the inadequate treatment of an
individual prisoner's medical needs constituted cruel and
44. See, e.g, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), holding that a state law
making the status of narcotics addiction a criminal offense, punishable by at least 90
days in jail, was cruel and unusual punishment. The Court held that narcotics
addiction was an illness, not a crime, and therefore not only was this punishment disproportionate, but also since it did not attempt to provide any medical or psychological aid to the addict, it did not serve any legitimate purpose. rd. at 675-675. See also,
e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion indicated that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment because of its
excessiveness. He observed that it serves no legitimate penal purpose more effectively
than the less severe punishment of life imprisonment. rd. at 358-359. (See infra note
43 for a discussion of the case) and see O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). (See
infra note 30 and the accompanying text for a discussion of this case).
45. See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). In this case a prisoner filed a civil
rights complaint against the Illinois State Penitentiary on the grounds that he was
not allowed to purchase certain religious pUblications and denied other privileges just
because of his religion. The Supreme Court held that the complaint stated a valid cause
of action. rd. at 546.
46. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) and Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978) (See infra notes 47 and 53 and the accompanying text for a discussion of these
cases). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). (See infra notes 58-62 and
accompanying text for a discussion ofthis case).
47. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In this case a prisoner in a Texas state prison brought a
suit against the medical director and two prison officials claiming that his eighth
amendment rights were violated because he was inadequately treated for a back
il\iury allegedly sustained during prison work. The court denied his claim because he
was unable to prove that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his existing
medical needs. rd. at 103-105.
48. rd. at 103.
49. rd. at 103-104.
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unusual punishment. 60 The Court held that the only way for a
prisoner to successfully challenge a deprivation of medical
treatment was to show that the medical personnel or prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to his treatment needs,
for only such indifference constitutes the wanton infliction of
pain prohibited by the eighth amendment. 51 Since the prisoner was only able to provide evidence that the prison and medical personnel were at most inattentive or negligent to his
needs, the eighth amendment was not violated. 53

Hutto v. Fi nney 53 was the first Supreme Court case to
specifically acknowledge that conditions of confinement are
a part of the punishment subject to eighth amendment
scrutiny. The Court in Hutto focused on the objective harm
to the prisoners caused by the challenged conditions of confinement 54 and not on the prison official's state of mind
relied as required in Estelle. 55 The eighth amendment, the
Court noted, prohibits severely disproportionate punishments 56 and punishments that violate "broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and
decency. "57
50. [d. at 101.
51. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
52. [d. Two important Supreme Court cases followed the reasoning in Estelle to
deny the prisoners' claims. In Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied ,479 U.S. 816 (1986) the court held that prisoners' eighth amendment
claims were invalid because they failed to show that the prison officials acted with deliberate or reckless indifference to the prisoners. [d. at 652. The claims stemmed from
injuries sustained in a bus fire while being transported between prisons. [d. at 648.
In Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) the Court held that, like in Estelle, prisoners must prove a mental element. However, instead of deliberate indifference, a prisoner must show that the prison officials acted maliciously and sadistically in cases
concerning whether a particular prison security measure posed a risk to the prisoners' safety in violation of the eighth amendment. [d. at 319.
53. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). The Court considered the validity of certain remedial
orders issued by the district court and affirmed by the Eighth Circuit after a finding
that conditions within the Arkansas penal system constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. The contested orders limited the amount of time that a prisoner could
be put in punitive isolation and awarded attorneys' fees and costs as a sanction for failing to cure other eighth amendment violations. {d. at 680-688. The Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the remedial orders. [d. at 688 - 689.
54. [d. at 685.
55. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The Court noted that the district court appropriately analyzed whether indeterminate sentencing in the punitive isolation cells violated contemporary standards of decency. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685.
56. [d. at 685 (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 367. See infra note 27 for a discussion
of Weems).
57. [d. (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (1968Xholding that the use
of the strap on prisoners in Arkansas prison was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of eighth amendment and enjoiningthe prison from its use.
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In Rhodes v. Chapman,68 the Court considered whether
double celling&9 prisoners constituted an eighth amendment
violation.5O The court observed that when determining whether
an eighth amendment violation has occurred, the court must,
as much as possible, use objective factors measured against
society's standards of decency as to the effect of the deprivation. 81 After reviewing relevant scientific evidence about
double ceIling, the Court concluded that double celling did
not offend contemporary standards of decency in violation of
the eighth amendment. 82
The most recent Supreme Court case concerning unconstitutionality of conditions of confinement, Wilson v. Seiter, 63
has added to the standard regarding prison deprivations set
forth in Hutto and Rhodes. The Court observed that conditions of confinement are not part of the punishment formally meted out by a statute or judge. 1U Therefore, in order to
have any eighth amendment violation as to conditions, the
prisoner must show that the prison officials intended to punish or at least were deliberately indifferent as to whether
the condition was punishment. 86 Prior to this decision, a
requirement that the prison officials had a purpose or intent
to inflict harm was only required for cases involving medical
treatment or guard brutality.88
58. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
59. Double celling is placing two prisoners in a cell designed to accommodate one
prisoner.
60. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 339.
61. Id. at 346-347.
62. Id.
63. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). The court considered the issue of whether certain conditions of confinement within the Ohio prison violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. The Court relied on Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312 (1986) (See infra note 52 for a discussion Whitley.) and observed that there
is a distinction between punishment formally imposed for a crime and conditions of
confinement. Id. at 2323-2324. The Court then relied on Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459 (1947) and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (See infra notes 26 and 4751 and accompanying text for a discussion of Resweber and Estelle.) as supporting the
proposition that for those punishments not formally meted out such as the conditions
of confinement, an inquiry into the state of mind of the prison officials must be performed.Id. at 2323. The Court held a violation of the eighth amendment exists only
ifit can be shown that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent. [d. at 23262327.
64. Wilson, III S. Ct. at 2324.
65. [d.
66. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
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THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT PRIOR TO WILSON

The Ninth Circuit has also had occasion to apply the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual conditions
of confinement afforded to prisoners through the eighth amendment. Prior to Wilson, the Ninth Circuit had consistently
used the objective standard for prison condition cases focusing
on the harm caused by the challenged conditions of confinement
when determining if a eighth amendment violation had
occurred. 67
In Spain v. Procunier,68 the Ninth Circuit considered the
constitutionality of certain prison conditions and practices in
San Quentin prison. 69 The court held that use of dangerous
amounts of tear gas violated society's contemporary standard
of decency70 and could only legitimately be used in certain situations.71 It also held that excessive use of mechanical
restraints was dehumanizing and violated the minimum
standards of decency protected by the eighth amendment. 72
67. However, the Ninth Circuit had applied the subjective deliberate indifference
standard to medical treatment and prisoner security cases. See, e.g., Berg v. Kincheloe,
794 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1986). In this case a prisoner claimed that his eighth amendment rights had been violated due to the prison officials disregard for his personal safety which caused him to be beaten and raped. Id. at 458. The Ninth Circuit held that
the prisoner had raised a valid eighth amendment claim concerning one of the prison
officials and observed that the deliberate indifference standard would be appropriate
to determine if this official violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause byexposing Berg to a threat of serious harm or injury by another prisoner. Id. at 459. See
also Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1991), holding that in order for the
prisoner to bring a valid eighth amendment claim concerning his deprivation of medical treatment and personal security, he must prove that prison officials acted with
deliberate indifference.ld. at 1347.
68. 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979). Six San Quentin prisoners, also known as the
San Quentin Six, were involved in the protest over prison conditions that occurred at
San Quentin in which some inmates and prison officials were killed. The San Quentin
six brought suit against the prison for certain allegedly unconstitutional conditions
and practices of confinement, including (1) excessive use oftear gas, (2) unreasonable
use of mechanical restraints, and (3) denial of any outdoor exercise. Id. at 193-200.
69.ld.

70. Id. at 196, (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,102 (1976) (quoting Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958».
71. Procunier, 600 F. 2d at 196. The court continued that this holding was not
a ban on the use of tear gas in the prison but only a prohibition against the unjustified use of dangerous quantities of tear gas. Use of non-dangerous amounts of tear gas
does not violate society standards of decency.ld.
72. Id. The court found that use of mechanical restraints during out of cell movements was "excessive, painful and degrading." Id. The Court found that the use of the
mechanical restraints were particularly unjustified when visiting with friends, relatives and counsel.ld. at 197.
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The court observed that even though there was no finding that
the prison officials intentionally shackled the prisoners to
punish them for the deaths of their fellow guards, wrongful
intent is only one element of eighth amendment review and
is not dispositive. 73 The state-of-mind of the prison official is
something to consider when analyzing whether the punishment advances a legitimate penal purpose, but a eighth
amendment violation may be found without a wrongful stateof-mind being shown. 74
In Franklin v. State of Oregon,76 the Ninth Circuit held
that a prisoner's complaint concerning inadequate ventilation, exercise and lighting were valid eighth amendment
claims. 78 The court also held that housing a prisoner with lung
cancer with a heavy smoker and denying the prisoner food after
being informed that he was having an insulin reaction were
potential eighth amendment violations. 77 Following Estelle, 78
the court observed, however, that for eighth amendment challenges involving medical mistreatment, the prisoner must not
only show that his health was seriously threatened, but that
the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. 79
In Hoptowit v. Spell man 80 the Ninth Circuit upheld the
district court's conclusion that many of the prison conditions
in the Washington State Prison were a serious threat to the
73. Procunier, 600 F.2d at 197.
74. [d.

75. 662 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981). The plaintiff, a prisoner in an Oregon state
prison, had filed various complaints concerning unconstitutional conditions of confinement, including (1) inadequate ventilation,lighting and exercise, (2)placing him
in a cell with a heavy cigarette smoker which was seriously dangerous to his health
since he had lung cancer, and (3) failing to provide him with food after he informed
the prison that he was having an insulin reaction. The court held that complaint (1)
was a legitimate eighth amendment issue after Procunier and that complaints (2) and
(3) also raised valid eighth amendment claims provided he could show that the prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs as required by Estelle. [d.
at 1347.
76. [d. The court cited Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979) as precedent for
its holding. [d. at 1346.
77. Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1347.
78. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See infra notes 47-51 for a discussion ofthis case.
79. Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1347.
80. 753 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985). In this case the Ninth Circuit held that inadequate lighting and ventilation, unsatisfactory plumbing, substandard fire prevention
and food service, vermin infestation,lack of maintenance, safety hazards in the occupational areas, and inadequate cell cleaning fell -below the minimum standards of
decency and violated plaintiffs' eighth amendment rights.· [d. at 783.
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prisoners' physical and mental health 81 and their safety.82
The court held these conditions fell below the "minimum
standards of decency"83 and amounted to a eighth amendment violation. 84
In McKinney v. Anderson,86 the Ninth Circuit held that the
eighth amendment is violated when inmates are exposed to
levels of Environmental Tobacco Smoke {"ETS")88 that pose an
unreasonable threat to their health. 8T The court held that society's attitude has evolved to a point where exposing an unwilling prisoner to dangerous levels of ETS violates contemporary
standards of decency.88 The court also held that this exposure
was unconstitutional even without exploring the evolving standards of decency because courts had already determined that conditions of confinement that pose an unreasonable risk to a
prisoner's health are unconstitutiona1. 89 The Fifth,90 Sixth,91
81. Id.
82.Id.
83.Id.
84. Hoptowit, 753 F.2d at 783.
85. 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Oct. 15
1991)(No. 91-269) (vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Wilson).
86. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1502. Environmental tobacco smoke, as opposed to
mainstream cigarette smoke, which is the smoke that smokers draw directly into their
lungs, is made up of mainstream smoke and sidestream smoke that cigarettes emit
between puffs. Id. at 1502. The toxic and carcinogenic effects of both are similar. Id.
at 1505 (citing U.S. Dep't of Health and Welfare, The Health consequences of
Involuntary Smoking, A Report of the Surgeon General 7 (1986).
87. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1507.
88. Id. at 1508. The court relied on Avery v. Powell, 652 F. Supp. 632 (D.N.H.
1988) and Clemmons v. Bohannon, 918 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1990) to support its holding. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1504-1505.
In Avery, the court held valid a claim that a prisoners' eighth amendment rights
were violated because his constant exposure to ETS was harmful to his health. Avery,
652 F. Supp. at 641.
In Clemmons, the Tenth Circuit found that exposing a prisoner to an unreasonable
risk of debilitating disease or death violated evolving standards of decency. Clemmons,
918 F.2d at 866. The court held the prisoner's claim, that involuntary exposure to ETS
is cruel and unusual punishment, was a valid eight amendment claim. Id. at 863.
89. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1507. The court relied onProcunier, 600 F.2d 201 and
Hoptowit, 753 F.2d 779, as having established that prisoners had a constitutional right
to clean air; thus exposure to ETS would be unconstitutional per se, without an
investigation into contemporary standards of decency. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1507.
90. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). The court found that
the discriminatory practices, the condition of the physical facilities, the inadequacy
of the medical treatment afforded the prisoners and other conditions offended modern concepts of decency in violation of the eighth amendment. Id. at 1299-1302.
91. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1977). The Sixth Circuit
held that petitioner's claim that the jailers deliberately withheld food from him in
order to coerce an confession for a offense committed in jail was a claim subject to scrutiny under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. Id. at 660.
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Eighth,92 and Tenth93 Circuits have also used the objective
standard to find that certain conditions of confinement in the
state prisons violated the eighth amendment.
III. WILSON V. SEITER - APPLICATION OF THE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD TO PRISON
CONDITIONS CASES
A.

THE MAJORITY

In Wilson v. Seiter9" the Court held that the deliberate
indifference standard must be used when what is contested is
not part of the punishment formally imposed by a statute or a
sentencing judge. 96 The Court relied on its past decisions in
Resweber,B8 Estelle,B7 and Whitl ey 9s to show that a state-ofmind inquiry must take place when determining whether a condition of confinement is cruel and unusual punishment. 99 The
92. See, e.g., Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1985). The court held that
petitioners' claims regarding the unhealthiness of the physical condition of the
prison, the inadequate diet and lack of personal hygiene items raised valid eighth
amendment claims. Id. at 1338.
93. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (lOth Cir. 1989). The court held that
certain conditions at the Colorado prison, including inadequate sanitation, diet, safety and medical care, failed to provide prisoners with the "basic human needs" and violated the eighth amendment.ld. at 585-586.
94. 111 S. Ct. 2321(1991) (opinion by J. Scalia, with whon Rehnquist C.J.,
O'Conner, Kennedy and Souter J.J. joins. White J. filed concurring opinion in which
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens J.J. joined).
95. Id. at 2322-2328. The prisoners claimed that the conditions of confinement
at the Ohio Prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoners complained of overcrowding, excessive noise, unsanitary conditions, and dirty lavatories.
They also stated that the prison was too hot in the summer and too cold in the winter, the food was prepared in unsanitary conditions and physically and mentally ill
prisoners were intermingled with other prisoners, posing threats to their health and
safety. Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 863,864 (6th Cir. 1990).
96. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). See infra note 26 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
97. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
98. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). In this case a prisoner claimed that
he was subject to cruel and unusual punishment when he was shot by a guard who was
trying to quell a prison disturbance. Id. The Court held that in situations where prison
officials have to make split second decisions as to whether to use force and end a protest
or let the disturbance persist, the appropriate inquiry is whether force was used in good
faith to restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing
harm.ld. at 319.
99. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326. The Sixth Circuit applied the Whitley standard to
the prisoners claim that the conditions of confinement violated the eighth amendment
in Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court held that
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Court observed that Resweber emphasized that a violation of
the eighth amendment required a "wanton infliction of pain. "100
In Resweber, since the infliction of a repeat electrocution was
due to an accident, the prison officials lacked the culpable
state of mind to make the punishment cruel. 101 The Court also
observed that it had applied this culpability requirement in
Estelle for deprivations suffered during imprisonment that
were not specifically part of the punishment. 102 Finally, the
Court observed that its recent decision in Whitley confirmed
that a mental element is required in prison condition cases
where the conduct challenged is not part of the punishment formally meted out by a sentencing judge. los The Court concluded that collectively these cases demand that a subjective
inquiry into the prison officials' state-of-mind must be performed when determining whether a violation of the eighth
amendment has occurred in cases challenging the conditions
of confinement. 104
'
The Court rejected the position that there should be a distinction between short-term or one time conditions, such as the
use of force to quell a prison disturbance that would require a
state-of-mind inquiry,' and ongoing conditions. lo6 The Court
also rejected the distinction drawn by the concurrence between
the Sixth Circuit was correct in determining that a mental element was required but
that the appropriate standard was deliberate indifference, not the malicious and
sadistic standard. Wilson III S. Ct. at 2328.
100. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463.
101. Id. at 464.
102. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2322 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (See infra notes
47-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case).
103. Id. The Court cited a passage from Whitley in support of this proposition.
After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due
care for the prisoner's interests or safety ... lt is obduracy
and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith
that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs
in connection with establishing conditions of confinement,
supplying medical needs or restoring official control over a
tumultuous cellblock. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
Id. at 2323.
104. Wilson, III S. Ct. 2323.
105. Id. at 2325. This position was presented by the United States as amicus
curaie in support of the prisoners. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on
Writ of Certiorari to The United States Court of Appeals for The Sixth Circuit at 1113, Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861 (1991) (No. 89-7376).
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specific acts or omissions aimed at individual prisoners at
issue in Whitley, Resweber, and Estelle and general conditions
of confinement. t08 The Court observed that there was no basis
for these distinctions, and furthermore, it is not the inclinations
of the courts that created the subjective element for eighth
amendment review, it is the meaning inherent in the cruel and
unusual punishment clause which required a state-of-mind
inquiry. to? To be considered punishment, acts must be
deliberately intended to chastise or deter. lOB Conditions of confinement are not part of the punishment imposed for these
penological purposes by the judge or a statute and cannot be
considered a part of the punishment. l09 Only when some mental element is shown on the part of the prison officials does a
challenged condition of confinement qualify as a punishment
subject to eighth amendment scrutiny.110 The court concluded,
in light of past decisions and the meaning inherent in the
cruel and unusual punishment clause, a state-of-mind inquiry
is necessary in determining whether conduct that is not part
of the penalty violates the constitution. 111
In discussing what type of state-of-mind inquiry is applicable,112 the Court relied on dictum from Whitley.113 The Court
observed that once conduct is determined to be objectively
severe,114 whether the resulting harm was wanton depends
upon the constraints facing the prison official. 116 Because prison
officials face the same constraints handling medical conditions as any other conditions of confinement, the Estelle
deliberate indifference standard should be used in both
106. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324.
107. [d.
108. [d. (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F. 2d 645 (7th Cir 1985). (See

infra note 52 for a discussion of the case.) The Court quoted Judge Posner:
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to
chastise or deter. This is what the word mean~ today, it is
what it meant in the eighteenth century .... [I]f [a] guard
accidentally stepped on [a] prisoner's toe and broke it, this
would not be punishment in anything remotely like the
accepted meaning of the word, whether we consult the usage
of 1791, or 1868 or 1985. Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 652.
Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2324.
109. [d.
110. [d.
111. [d. at 2326.

112. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326. The Court explained objective severity as conduct that satisfies the Rhodes evolving standards of decency test. [d.
113. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319·321 (1986).
114. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
115. [d.
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situations. u6 The Court rejected the stricter malicious and
sadistic standard applied in Whitley, because the prison officials
are faced with different constraints when acting in response to
the more threatening circumstances of a prison disturbance. 117
B.

THE CONCURRENCE u8

The concurrence agreed with the majority in judgment
only.u9 The concurrence strongly disagreed that prisoners who
challenge the conditions of confinement within a prison must
show deliberate indifference by the prison officials. 120 The concurrence disagreed with the majority's holding for three reasons: it is contrary to precedent, it will be impossible to apply,
and it will create a easy defense to any constitutional
challenge. 121
The concurrence tacitly rejected the majority's conclusion
that a mental element is required because the conditions of confinement are not part of the punishment formally meted out by
the sentencing judge or statute. 122 The concurrence observed
that the Court had previously held in Hutto l23 and Rhodes 124 that
although not formally imposed by a sentencing judge or statute,
conditions of confinement are part of the punishment subject
to eighth amendment scrutiny.l26 As part of the punishment,
l16. [d. This reasoning was derived from Lafaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir.
1987) (involving a complaint by a paraplegic inmate that the prison officials violated
the eighth amendment due to the inhumane conditions of his confinement and
their failure to provide him with needed physical therapy). The Court noted that Lalaut
established that whether the prisoner's treatment is c;haracterized as inadequate attention to his medical needs or inhumane conditions of confinement, Estelle's deliberate
indifference standard should be used. Lafaut, 834 F.2d at 391-392. Wilson, l11 S. Ct.
2326.
l17. [d. at 2328. The court concluded that the Sixth Circuit erred in applying the
Whitley standard and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the opinion.
The court noted that since the Sixth Circuit had found that the prison officials acted
with at most mere negligence, using the deliberate indifference standard instead of
Whitley's malicious and sadistic standard will not change the outcome ofthe case. [d.
l18. Wilson, l11 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (1991)(White, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J.
and Stevens, J. concurring).
l19. [d.
120. [d.
121. [d. at 2328-2330.
122. Wilson, l11 S. Ct. at 2328. The concurrence observed that the majority did
not dispute that the intent element is not needed when the pain and suffering complained of is part of the punishment imposed on convicted prisoners. [d.
123. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
124. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
125. Wilson, l11 S. Ct. at 2328-2329.
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the objective severity of the conditions and not the prison officials' state of mind must be examined when determining if the
eighth amendment has been violated. 126
The concurrence argued that the majority's reliance upon
Resweber, 127 Estelle l28 and Whitleyl29 to support the necessity of
an intent element in prison condition cases was misplaced. ISO
These cases challenged specific acts or omissions directed at
individual prisoners. 131 A state-of-mind inquiry was required
because these cases concerned conduct which was aimed at particular prisoners in isolated incidents which did "not purport
to be punishment at all. "132 Because these cases did not involve
conduct that was part of punishment, they were inappropriate
precedent to establish that an intent element is necessary in
cases concerning prison conditions, since prison conditions
have been held to be part of punishment. 13s
The concurrence pointed out the difficulty of applying the
subjective standard as an additional reason why only the
objective conditions of confinement should be examined. IS' It
observed that it will be very difficult to determine whose
intent should be scrutinized, since conditions of confinement
often result from the actions and omissions of numerous prison
officials in and out of the prison. 136 The concurrence noted
that the majority did not address how this problem will be dealt
with and that "[iJn truth intent simply is not very meaningful
when considering a challenge to an institution such as a prison
126. Id. The concurrence quoted language from Rhodes:
Conditions (of confinement) ...• may deprive inmates of the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel and unusual under the contemporary
standards of decency ....Rhodes. 452 U.S. at 347.
Id. at 2328.
127. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
128. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
129. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
130. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2329.
131. Id. In Resweber. 329 U.S. 459 (1947) the prisoner challenged the constitutionality of subjecting him to a repeat execution. In Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) the prisoner challenged the inadequate attention to his serious medical needs. Whitley, 475
U.S. 312 (1986) concerned a prisoner's challenge to the constitutionality of a prison
guard shooting him during the course of a prison riot.
132. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2329 (quoting Whitley. 475 U.S. at 319).
133. Id. The concurrence cited Gillespe v. Crawford. 833 F.2d 47. 50 (5th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam) as establishing this argument.
134. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2329.
135. Id. at 2330.
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system."138 This is why, noted the concurrence, lower courts
have consistently applied the objective standard. 137
The concurrence indicated that the most significant and
potentially dangerous result of the majority's holding is that it will
open up the possibility for a easy defense to an eighth amendment
claim. l38 Prison officials will be able to claim that it is inadequate funds, not a wrongful state of mind, that has created the contested conditions of confinement. 139 The concurrence concluded that
inhumane conditions of confinement should not be shielded from
eighth amendment scrutiny due to inadequate funding. 14O Having
made the choice to use prisons as a form of punishment, each state
must take responsibility to ensure that the conditions in its prisons comport with contemporary standards of decency. 141 A requirement of deliberate indifference will mean that serious deprivations
of basic human needs in the prisons will go unredressed. 142
IV. AFTER WILSON - THE APPLICATION OF THE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD IN THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
Only a small number of decisions concerning cruel and
unusual conditions of confinement the prisons have been
handed down by the Ninth Circuit since Wilson. 143
136. 1d.
137. 1d. at n.1.
138. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330.
139. 1d. For example, if a prisoner complains about inadequate nutrition or
sanitation the prison officials can claim it is budget considerations that created the
unhealthy environment and not their intent to harm the prisoners.
140. 1d. The majority addressed this issue briefly in response to the amicus brief
filed by the U.S. Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae on Writ of Certiorari to
The United States Court of Appeals for The Sixth Circuit at 11-13, Wilson v. Seiter, 893
F.2d 861 (1990). It acknowledged that fiscal constraints may provide a defense to
eighth amendment challenges, but it cannot bear on the meaning of the intent requirement that is implicit in the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2325.
Further, the majority stated that the "cost" defense was not an issue in the case.1d.
141. 1d.
142. 1d.
143. See Smith v. McCarthy, 937 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 89-15540)
(unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library) (See infra note 144 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case). See also Redman v. San Diego, 942
F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991). (See infra note 151 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the case); Whitmore v. Sumner, 944 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991)(Table) (No. 89-15861)
(unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library) (See infra note 161 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the text); Jordon v. Gardner, _ F.2d _ (9th
Cir. 1992) 1992 WL 2084; Lane v. Martinak, _ F.2d _ (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No.
90-35805) (unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library); and Schultz
v. Goldsmith, 942 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 90-16620) (unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library).
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In Smith v. McCarthyl44 the Ninth Circuit held that the prisoner's challenge to certain conditions in administrative confinement, namely inadequate shelter and lack of outdoor
exercise, presented valid eighth amendment claims. 146 The
court cited Hoptowit 146 as establishing both that all prisoners
must be afforded eighth amendment protection, including
those in administrative segregation, and that prisoners must
be provided adequate shelter.147 The court observed that
Procunier l48 established that denial of outdoor exercise may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 149 The court concluded,
however, that after Wilson these claims will only be successful
if the petitioner can show that the prison officials acted with
deliberate indifference. 16o Although the Ninth Circuit adopted the deliberate indifference standard in this case, it did not
indicate what the petitioner will have to prove to show such
indifference.
In Redman v. San Diego 161 the issue before the court was
whether improperly placing a pre-trial detainee in a dangerous situation, despite his pleas for protection, violated his
fourteenth amendment due process right to personal security. 162
The court held that deliberate indifference was the appropriate
standard to use when determining if an inmate's right of personal security had been violated. 163 Deliberate indifference
144. 937 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 89-15540)(unpublished disposition
text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library). A prisoner claimed that his eighth amendment
rights were violated when he was arbitrarily moved from general population to
administrative segregation. In administrative segregation he claimed he was denied
outdoor exercise and adequate shelter. [d.
145. [d. (citing Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) as establishing the deliberate indifference standard). The court held that Smith's contention that he was arbitrarily placed
in segregation, subject to retaliatory action by the prison officials, and that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and safety and used excessive force in stopping a prison riot, as well as the contention that the defendants were
racially discriminatory, lacked merit. [d.
146. 753 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985).
147. Smith, 937 F.2d 613.
148. 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979).
149. Smith, 937 F.2d 613 (citing Procunier ,600 F.2d at 199-200.).
150. [d.
151. 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991). Redman, a pre-trial detainee who was
repeatedly raped by another inmate despite his pleas for protection, filed a complaint against the prison officials and the County of San Diego alleging his fourteenth
amendment due process rights were violated. He alleged that his rights were violated
because the defendants committed acts that deprived him of his rights to personal security. [d. at 1439. (Since Redman was a pre-trial detainee and had not been convicted of a crime, he had to posture his action as a deprivation of substantive due process
rights instead of a violation of the eighth amendment.). [d.
152. [d. at 1439.
153. Redman, 942 F.2d at 1443.
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was shown on the part of the county and the prison officials
because they were responsible for developing and implementing the procedural policies and customs which maintained
the overcrowding in the jails. 154 This overcrowding knowingly
resulted in a lack of supervision, which created safety problems
in the jail. I55 To deal with the overcrowding, prison officials
developed the custom of placing prisoners in improper areas,
posing an unconstitutional risk of harm to Redman's personal security. 156
The Ninth Circuit dealt with personal security issues in the
context of a eighth amendment challenge in Jordan v.
Gardner. 157 The court in Jordan, without referring to the deliberate indifference standard, rejected the women prisoners'
challenge to cross-gender pat searches. 158 The court observed
that although the pat searches may be unpleasant they do
not violate evolving standards of decency. 159 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that pat searches are necessary and legitimate
means of addressing internal security and therefore no eighth
amendment violation had occurred. 160
154. ld. at 1443-1446.
155. ld.
156. ld. But see Lane v. Martinank, 951 F.2d. 360 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 9035805) (unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library). The Court rejected a 14th amendment challenge by a pre-trial detainee to the conditions of confinement.
Lane had claimed that his constitutional rights were violated when he was served
maggot and boll weevil infested food. The court applied the deliberate indifference
standard andfound that Lane had failed to show that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent since they replaced the infested meal as soon as it was discovered.ld.
157. _ F.2d _ (9th Cir. 1992), 1992 WL 2084.
158. Cross-gender pat searches are when a prison guard pat searches a prisoner of the opposite sex. The pat searches at issue in this case included a search of the
breast and crotch area of the prisoner.
159. Jordan, at *6. The court observed that the Supreme Court has upheld
prisoner searches more intrusive than the cross-gender pat searches, including body
cavity searches, these fully clothed searches do not offend modern standards of
decency.ld.
160. ld. at *5. The court noted that it was required to give great deference to
prison officials' policies regarding internal security. Because the cross-gender pat
searches were implemented for legitimate security purposes they do no amount to the
"gratuitous infliction of suffering" necessary for a eighth amendment violation. ld.
Justice O'Scannlain in his dissent pointed out that a eighth amendment violation
requires that the challenged activity constitute unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain. He noted that the evidence more than supported that there was unreasonable
risk of harm to the prisoners from the pat searches. Jordan _ F.2d _ (9th Cir. 1992),
1992 WL 2084 at *9. (J. O'Scannlain concurring in part and dissenting in part) and
that the searches were unnecessary and without penological justification.ld. at *10.
Most importantly he observed that the majority completely ignored the issue of
whether the infliction of pain was wanton.ld.
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In Whitmore v. Sumner 161 the Ninth Circuit addressed how
the deliberate indifference standard should be applied. 162 The
court observed that in cases challenging prison conditions,
the prisoner must prove an objective component, whether
there was a serious deprivation of rights, and a subjective
component, whether the prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference. l63 The court denied that the plaintiffs had provided
Citing Wilson, Justice O'Scannlain, stated that for eighth amendment claims based
on conduct that is not part of the formal punishment meted out by ajudge or statute,
deliberate indifference satifies the wantoness requirement. Furthermore, since the
prison officials were aware of the negative psychological impact cross-gender searches would have on the women prisoners before the policy was implemented, the prisoners met their burden of establishing deliberate indifference. [d. at *11.
161. 944 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.1991)(Table)(No. 89-15540)(unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library.) Prisoners claimed that their eighth amendment rights had been violated because the prison officials allowed an HIV-infected
inmate, who had previously thrown his bodily fluids at others, to deliver meals to the
cells. [d.
162. [d. See also Schultz v. Goldsmith, 947 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table)(No.
90-16620) (unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library.)(holding
that although the prisoner may have shown that his exposure to ETS caused him an
unreasonable risk of harm, the case must be remanded so that he may amend the complaint to show deliberate indifference.) and see Jordan _ F.2d _ (9th Cir. 1992),
1992 WL 2084 at *9. (J. O'Scannlain concurring in part and dissenting in part)(noting that a eighth amendment claim includes an objective finding of harm and a subjective inquiry into the prison officials state of mind). [d.
163. 944 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (unpublished dispositions, text in
WESTLAW, Allfeds Library). This two prong standard was implied in Wilson,lll S.
Ct. 2321 and has been consistently applied after Wilson. See, e.g., Smith, 937 F.2d
613 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 89-15540)(unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library) In Smith the Ninth Circuit relied upon its decision in which
it applied the objective standard prior to Wilson to establish that the challenged conditions in Smith were subject to eighth amendment scrutiny. The court suggested that
the SUbjective standard be applied to determine whether the prison officials acted with
deliberate indifference to those conditions. [d.
See also Johnson v. Williams, 768 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. VA 1991). The court held
that the restrictions placed on prisoners during a prison lock down did not violate the
eighth amendment. The court observed, "no eighth amendment claim is stated unless
plaintiff establishes both that conditions were sufficiently serious and that defendants
were deliberately indifferent to those conditions.· [d.
Almost all of the other Circuits that have addressed this issue since Wilson
have also interpreted the deliberate indifference standard as involving both a subjective
and objective component. See, e.g., Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir.
1991). (held that defendants were deliberately indifferent to prisoners by exposing them
to freezing temperatures without protection in violation of the eighth amendment).
The Seventh Circuit observed that certain conditions of confinement, such as providing
inadequate heat, have been held to be objectively in violation of the eighth amendment
and that only the subjective element required has changed. [d.
See also, e.g., Alberti, 937 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1991) (held that state could be
held liable for the conditions in the jail system but remanded the decision to determine
if state was deliberately indifferent). The Fifth Circuit observed that Wilson's deliberate indifference requirement is not completely separate from the objective requirement of Rhodes. [d. To meet the deliberate indifference requirement prison officials
must be aware of objectively cruel conditions and fail to fix them. [d.
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enough evidence to satisfy the strict subjective standard
required after Wilson. 164
V. THE APPLICATION OF THE DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE STANDARD IN OTHER CIRCUITS
Because there have been only a few cases decided in the
Ninth Circuit concerning prison conditions since Wilson, the
opinions from other circuits may help to define how the Wilson
test will be applied in the Ninth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit in
Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, Tex. 166 used reasoning similar to Redman to find that the jail and prison officials may have
been deliberately indifferent to the inmates' rights under the
eighth amendment. 166 In this case the inmates in Texas jails
challenged the deplorable conditions of confinement caused by
severe overcrowding. 167 This overcrowding was caused by the
state's policy ofleaving "prison ready felons"168 in county jail in
order to eliminate the state prison overcrowding. 169 The court
observed that because the state and county chose to leave
"prison ready-felons" in the jail despite that fact that the overcrowding made the conditions of confinement unconstitutional, 170
164. Whitmore, 944 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.1991)(Table)(No. 89-15540)(unpublished
disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library.) Judge Fletcher in his dissent,
observed that the plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence to prove a eighth amendment violation after Wilson. Fletcher stated:
Here, plaintiffs presented evidence that prison officials placed
plaintiffs in contact with an HIV-infected inmate who had not
only thrown his urine at other inmates, but had also engaged
in self-mutilation in an effort to infect other persons through
contact with his blood. Plaintiffs also presented evidence
that suggested that prisons officials had taken precautions to
protect the staff ofthe correctional facility, but did not show
similar concern for the safety of the prisoners ....
Whitmore, 944 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.1991)(Table)(No. 89-15540)(unpublished disposition,
text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library.) (J. Fletcher dissenting).
165. 937 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1991).
166. [d. at 998-1000. The court noted that the deliberate indifference standard
would likely be met. However, since Wilson was decided while the case was pending
review, the court was reluctant to rule that the defendants were deliberately indifferent
as a matter of law. [d. at 1000.
167. [d. at 986.
168. Prison ready felons or ready felons are terms used to refer to persons convicted of felonies who are ready to start state prison terms.
169. Alberti, 937 F.2d at 998-1000.
170. [d. This case originated over 20 years ago. Various remedial orders and
preliminary injunctions have been issued to the County and State to make the
conditions of confinement within the prisons and jails comply with the constitution.
At this point in the litigation, the State and the County are not disputing the fact that
the jail is overcrowded and the conditions of confinement are unconstitutional, rather
they are fighting over who is responsible for the situation. [d. The county contends that
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they could be found to be deliberately indifferent to the
prisoners. 171
The Fifth Circuit also acknowledged that Wilson required
an additional consideration in the deliberate indifference
equation. 172 The court observed that when determining if a
defendant has been deliberately indifferent, the constraints facing the defendant must be examined. 173 This requires that the
court consider the possible reasons why defendants may have
delayed or chosen to maintain certain situations that led to a
constitutional deprivation. 174 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged
in Alberti that the State had many common-sense alternatives available other than refusing to admit ready-felons which
created the overcrowding in the jails. 176 The court also observed
that the constraints allegedly imposed by lack of legislative
funding could be considered but would not be dispositive.1 76
the jails are overcrowded because of the state's admissions policy that failed to accept
convicted felons housed in county jails but sentenced to state prison. The state contends that the jail would be overcrowded anyway and that problems existed within the
jail despite the amount of ready felons. [d,
The lower court determined that as a result of the overcrowding over 2900 prisoners had to sleep on the floor. There also was inadequate plumbing, ventilation, fire
safety, supplies, food and staff to ensure personal safety. [d. at 990.
171. Alberti, 937 F.2d 984.
172. [d. at 998.
173. [d. The dissent in Redman, 942 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir. 1991).(J. Thompson and
J. Alarcon, dissenting), also acknowledged that the constraints facing the prison
officials must be taken into consideration when determining if they were deliberately indifferent. [d. at 1450. The dissent observed that this is why the courts must defer
to the prison officials informed decisions because only they understand the competing concerns that exist within a prison. [d.
174. Alberti, 937 F.2d 984 at 998-999.
175. [d.
176. [d. at 999-1000. The court noted that prior to Wilson, "inadequate funding
[would] not excuse the perpetration of unconstitutional conditions of confinement." [d.
(Citing Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1319-20 (5th Cir. 1974)(See infra note 90 for
a discussion of the case), and that other circuits, including the Ninth, have found deliberate indifference over allegations of inadequate funding. [d. (citing Jones v. Johnson,
781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1985), Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 759 F.2d
700,705 (11th Cir. 1985) and Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir.
1983». The court also noted that this issue is likely to be discussed frequently after
Wilson since the Supreme Court did not specifically address the issue. [d.
The dissent in Redman, 942 F.2d 1415, 1450 (9th Cir. 1991)(J. Fernandez, dissenting) observed that ifit was found that overcrowding led to the policy ofimproperly placing inmates in situations that pose a risk to their safety and that the prison
policymakers allowed the facility to be overcrowded, then deliberate indifference
could be found. Furthermore, the fact that the overcrowding might be a result of economics would not change the culpability. [d. at 1456. Justice Fernandez stated,
"That kind of economics does not define our constitutional rights. In any event,
economists have expatiated on the value to be found in enforcement of individual rights
when we wish to encourage people to rethink their attitudes toward imposing risks
on others in order to save initial outlays of money by themselves." [d.
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In Henderson v. DeRobertis,l77 the Seventh Circuit succinctly enunciated what is required to show deliberate indifference. 178 This case involved the issue of whether exposing two
prisoners to extremely cold temperatures without any protection violated the eighth amendment.179 The court observed
that deliberate indifference could be inferred if the prison
officials had actual knowledge of potential harm to the prisoners from the objectively severe conditions, that harm was easily preventable,180 and yet they failed to prevent it. 181 The court
found that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the
defendants knew the inmates were exposed to hazardously
cold conditions in violation of their constitutional right to
adequate heat, and they could have avoided the harm to the
prisoners by giving them adequate protection but did not. 182
Therefore, their conduct constituted deliberate indifference to
the prisoners' eighth amendment rights. 18s
Only one decision to date, Steading v. Thompson, 184 has
attributed a strict interpretation of the deliberate indifference standard, where the prisoners must show that the prison
officials intended their discomfort.18s In this case, similar to
McKinney, 186 the court considered whether exposing prisoners
to ETS constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 187 The court
held that there was no constitutional violation because when
the prison officials decided to allow smoking, they did not do
so with the intent to harm non-smokers.188 Consequently, the
prisoners had not met the deliberate indifference standard. 189
177. 940 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1991).
178. [d. at 1059.
179. [d. at 1056.
180. [d. at 1059. The court observed that a prisoners rights to adequate heat has
long been established and is constant, therefore the defendants had actual knowledge
that exposing the prisoners to freezing temperatures without adequate protection was
in violation of the constitution. Henderson 940 F.2d at 1060.
181. [d. at 1059 (citing Duckworth V. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986) (See infra note 52 for a discussion of the case».
182. Henderson 940 F.2d at 1060.
183. [d.
184. 941 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1991). (held that prison officials were not deliberately
indifferent to prisoners by exposing them to ETS, since they did not intend to harm
them by exposing them to such smoke).
185. [d. at 499.
186. 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Oct. 15
1991) (vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Wilson). See infra
notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
187. Steading, 941 F.2d at 499.
188. [d.
189. [d. By requiring this concept of an intent to harm, the court seems to be mistakenly applying the malicious and sadistic standard from Whitley, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)
rather than the deliberate indifference standard.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/17

24

Rubin: Prison Law

PRISON LAW

1992]

VI.

231

CONCLUSION

Most of the decisions in the courts concerning challenges to
the constitutionality of prison conditions after Wilson have
applied the deliberate indifference standard as a two-prong
test. Under this test, the prisoners must prove that the conditions of confinement are objectively severe, and also show that
the prison officials knew of the severity of the conditions and
yet chose to ignore or delay the prevention of the harm that
results from these conditions. Relying on past cases, the
Ninth Circuit has been able to find that the challenged conditions were objectively severe and resulted in harm to the prisoners. Ioo However, on the issue of deliberate indifference the
court has either found that none existed I9I or remanded with
doubt that such will be found. I92 Redman 193 is the only Ninth
Circuit case to date where deliberate indifference has been
found. The court explicitly indicated in Redman that its analysis and conclusions pertain only to fourteenth amendment due
process challenges where a prisoner's right to personal security has been violated. I94
The difficulty that prisoners have had and will likely
have in the future of showing deliberate indifference in cases
challanging the conditions of confinement in the Ninth
Circuit, might be explained by the problems predicted by
190. See Smith, 937 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 89-15540)(unpublished
disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library)(to deprive prisoners or adequate food,
clothing, shelter, sanitation, etc, in administrative segregation violates the eighth
amendment if prison officials act with deliberate indifference). See also Whitmore, 944
F.2d 910 (Table) (No. 89-15861)(unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds
Library) (plaintiffs had not offered enough evidence to prove the subjective component
of the standard.).
191. See Whitmore, 944 F.2d 910 (Plaintiff did not offer enough evidence to find
deliberate indifference), and see Hernandez v. Lewis, 942 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1991)
(Table) (No 90-16434)(unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library)
(holding plaintiff failed to provide any genuine issues of material fact that the prison
official were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.), Martinak, 951 F.2d 360
(9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 90-35805) (unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW,
Allfeds Library)(no facts suggest deliberate indifference by prison officials), Addleman,
_F.2d _ , (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 99-15651) (unpublished disposition, text in
WESTLAW, Allfeds Library). (nothing in the record indicates that the prison officials
were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner).
192. See Smith, 937 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 89-15540)(unpublished
disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library)(remanded to District Court on issue
of deliberate indifference).
193. 942 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir. 1991).
194. Id.
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the concurrence in Wilson 196 and the Amicus Curiae. l96 These
authorities explained that a subjective component is inappropriate in eighth amendment review. Such a standard is
inappropriate because it is contrary to precedent197 and unsupported by the language, history or intent of the eighth amendment. 198 In addition, these authorities predicted that it may be
difficult to find fault on the part of the prison officials because
inhumane prison conditions, unlike specific instances of violence or inadequate attention to a prisoners medical needs,'99
often are the result of high demands on the prison officials and
not the result of an intention to harm the prisoners. 2oo
The concurrence raised another potential problem with
the use of the deliberate indifference standard: the prison
official's ability to use lack of resources as a defense to eighth
amendment claims. 201 This defense will enable a prison official
to claim that it is inadequate funding and not any wrongful
195. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2321(1991) (White, J., Marshall, J. Blackmun, J. and
Stevens, J. concurring).
196. Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae on Writ of Certiorari to The
United States Court of Appeals for The Sixth Circuit at 11·13, Wilson v. Seiter, 893
F.2d 861 (1991) (No. 89·7376)(hereinafter cited as U.S. BrieO.
197. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2328·2329 (White, J., Marshall, J. Blackmun, J. and
Stevens, J. concurring) (citing Hutto, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) and Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337
( 1981».
198. U.S. Brief at 5. The United States explained that the text of the eighth
amendment does not include any intent language. [d. at 15. Punishment refers to meth·
ods or kinds of punishment, and cruel refers to the type of prohibited punishment with·
out respect to intent. [d. Furthermore, the framers had not meant to import an
intent element; they were primarily concerned with prohibiting tortuous and exces·
sive methods punishment. [d. at 16. Finally, the United States observed that the
Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the clause to prohibit barbarity and to pro·
mote contemporary standards of humanity and decency. [d.
199. [d. at 18 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. 312(1986) and Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976».
200. [d. at 19. The United States stated:
[S]eriously inhumane, pervasive conditions should not be
insulated from constitutional challenge because the offi·
cials managing the institution have inhibited a conscientious
concern for ameliorating its problems and have made efforts
(albeit unsuccessful) to that end ... the failure of the gov·
ernment to meet inmates' basic human needs constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment whether or not fault can be
clearly ascribed to the particular officials responsible for
running the facility.
[d.
See also Branham, When Are Prison Conditions Cruel and Unusual? Preview of
the United States Supreme Court Cases 1990·1991 Term. Issue No.6 (ABA February
1991) This article discusses the possible outcomes of the Supreme Court's Wilson v.
Sei ter decision.
201. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330.
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intent that created the inhumane condition. Although the
Ninth Circuit indicated in one instance that economic considerations will not be allowed to deprive prisoners of their
eighth amendment rights,202 and other circuits have also
observed that states may have to deal with their problems of
overcrowding without making the legislature the culprit/03
the Supreme Court dismissed the issue as having no bearing
on the consideration of whether an intentional element is
needed for eighth amendment review. 21M Therefore, there still
is significant opportunity for the Supreme Court to rule dispositively on the issue.
Due to the excessive overcrowding in the prisons and the
acknowledged lack of available funds to remedy the situation,
if the Court decides that economic constraints should be considered in the deliberate indifference equation, the possibility of a prisoner successfully challenging the conditions of
confinement will be significantly restricted. 206 Almost any
inhumane prison condition could be construed to be a result of
inadequate funds. For example, a prisoners' challenge to lack
of outdoor exercise could be defended with a claim that lack of
funds created staff shortages which resulted in the prison
officials' inability to provide the requisite supervision for outdoor exercise.
In conclusion, although the Ninth Circuit is bound by
Wilson, based on the problems inherent in the deliberate indifference standard and the effect it has had on prisoners'
attempts to challenge the conditions of confinement discussed
above, it may be a precedent that is worthy of rejection by the
individual states. 206
The Wilson deliberate indifference standard may be appropriate for cases challenging the constitutionality of specific
instances of conduct that have never been considered part of
the punishment. 207 In cases involving specific instances, like the
202. See Redman, 942 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir. 1991)(Fernandez, J. dissenting).
203. See infra note 176 for a discussion of inadequate funding and deliberate indifference.
204. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2325.
205. See Branham, When Are Prison Conditions Cruel and Unusual? Preview of the
United States Supreme Court Cases 1990-1991 Term. Issue No.6 (ABA February 1991).
206. However, it should be noted that eighteen states (including California)
and Puerto Rico, in an amicus brief, sided with the prison officials' position that a subjective element is required.
207. U.S. Brief at 21.
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alleged inadequate medical treatment afforded the prisoner in
Estelle,208 it may be necessary to require a state-of-mind inquiry.
A subjective inquiry may be necessary to qualify such conduct
as a constitutional violation since, arguably, mere negligent
medical treatment does not amount to a eighth amendment violation. However, because the conditions of confinement are part
of the penalty of imprisonment, no subjective inquiry is
required to make them qualify for eighth amendment scrutiny. If the conditions are objectively inhumane they violate the
protections guaranteed by the eighth amendment. The appropriate standard therefore is the objective standard described
in Rhodes. 209 The Rhodes standard properly focused on the
objective conditions as experienced by the inmates and whether
those conditions result in the "unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs,"2IO or "deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities. "211
The states may wish to adopt such a standard that is
appropriately focused on the objective inhumanity of the conditions laid out in Rhodes 212 and not on a difficult search for
deliberate indifference required by Wilson. Under Wilson,
despite a court's conclusion that a prisoner has been deprived
of life's basic necessities, it will not be able to provide a remedy because it will be constrained by the arduous search for
deliberate indifference.

Amanda Rubin *

208. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
209. Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). The United States noted that Rhodes was the
first Supreme Court case to specifically deal with the legal standards applicable for
general conditions of confinement in the prisons. U.S. Brief at 20. The United States
also noted that in Rhodes the Court acknowledged that conditions of confinement may
compose the punishment. [d.
210. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
211. [d.
212. [d.
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